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COMMENTS
case of "watered" stock, the fraud theory is still followed by the ma-
jority, but the statutory obligation doctrine is attracting increasing
attention. Although an individual creditor may still bring a bill in
equity against any of the unpaid shareholders in behalf of all creditors
similarly situated, the accepted practice in Washington today is to
have, a receiver appointed to bring suit for each stockholder's propor-
tionate share of the corporate indebtedness.
JANF SUE ABERNETHY.
TORT LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
The protective and friendly attitude with which the courts and
legislatures have viewed charities is reflected in the rule of non-
liability for torts committed by such eleemosynary institutions.' The
rationales for this exemption may be briefly classified into five main
groups. The first and most all inclusive, is the trust fund doctrine
based on an early English case and exemplified by the Massachusetts
decisions. 2 Under this theory a charitable institution can not be held
liable for the negligence of servants and employees or administrative
officials.3 Nor is the court concerned with the status of the plaintiff
as beneficiary, employee or stranger.4 The trust fund can not be diverted
from the charitable purposes for which it was intended to compensate
for one injured in the execution of these duties.
The non-applicability of the rule of respondeat superior is also
suggested as a basis for the freedom from liability.5 The public policy
behind the usual application of the rule is felt to be lacking in this
situation since the master does not profit by the employment of the
servant. An interesting variation of this rule is suggested by the New
York court which held that the master servant relationship, itself,
did not exist between the hospital and its doctors, internes, or nurses."
IThis same attitude is reflected in the tax statute granting exemptions
to charities. WASH. LAWS 1939, c. 206 § 8; REM. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939)
§ 1111. Also see the Unemployment Compensation Act, WASH. LAWS 1937, c.
162 § 19; REm. REv. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 9908-119, and Virginia Mason Hos-
pital Association v. Larson, 109 Wash. Dec. 323, 114 P. (2d) 976 (1941),
interpreting it.
2Heriot's Hospital v. Ross was cited by the Massachusetts court as
authority for granting immunity. McDonald v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am. Rep. 529 (1876). The true interpretation
of this early English case has been the basis of much discussion. See
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
'Kidd v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E.
55 (1921); Rosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392 (1920).
'Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n., 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921)
(injury to servant); Loeffler v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt
Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Atl. 301 (1917) (injury to stranger); Reavey v.
Guild of St. Agnes, 248 Mass. 316, 187 N. E. 557 (1933) (injury to servant);
Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113 (1923)
(stranger injured by negligence of ambulance driver).
5 Southern Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507,
46 P. (2d) 118 (1935); Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 AtL
595 (1895).
6Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199
(1924); In Matter of Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140
N. E. 694 (1923).
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A somewhat less rigid approach is the doctrine of waiver,7 i.e., that a
patient, student, or other beneficiary by accepting the services of the
institution impliedly waives any right to hold the charity liable for
torts committed against him.8 Jurisdictions following this view gen-
erally permit strangers and employees to recover since there, is no
conduct from which a contract to release the institution from liability
can be implied.
The analogy to a governmental agency and the contention that a
governmental function is being performed has also been advanced.'
Finally the broad plea of public policy has found favor in many
jurisdictions;'" and even in the preceding cases it is actually the basis
in most jurisdictions for granting immunity to charitable corporations.
The need for encouraging gifts to charity, the fear that the enforcing
of tort liability will discourage bequests, and the feeling that the
public is benefitted by protecting the funds from depletion through
numerous lawsuits are a few of the reasons behind such a position.
Modernly the tendency has been away from the stringent rule of
the trust fund doctrine. In the majority of states, strangers"' and
employees' 2 have been able to recover for torts committed against
them. Even as to the so-called beneficiary of the charity a more mod-
erate view has also been adopted in many jurisdictions. A charitable
institution is liable for its negligence in the selection and retention of
its servants but not for the negligence of those servants prudently
selected.'" In California this doctrine has been extended to even a
7 Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 284 (C. C. A.
1st, 1901); Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. (2d)
520 (1931) (this case has been overruled in effect by a later case-see
note 24 infra); Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. 675, 99 S. W. 453
(1907).
8 The fact that the patient pays for his service does not seem important,
as the court continues to treat him as a recipient of the benefits of the
charity. Stoner v. Big Sisters Hospital, supra note 7; Barr v. Brooklyn
Children's Aid, Soc., 190 N. Y. Supp. 296 (1921).
'Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc. of Wisconsin, 218 Wis.
169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935). The government agency argument has found
little favor in more recent cases and has been advanced but seldom since
the earlier decisions.
°Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 41 F. (2d) 869
(C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104
S. C. 197, 88 S. E. 649 (1916) (public policy argument used to defeat
recovery by stranger).
" 109 A. L. R. 1199; Hughes v. President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 33 F. Supp. 867 (App. D. C., 1940) (stranger); Wright v. Salva-
tion Army, 125 Neb. 216, 249 N. W. 549 (1933) (injury to stranger); Marble
v. Nicholas Senn Hospital Ass'n. of Omaha, 102 Neb. 343, 167 N. W. 208
(1918) (stranger injured by negligence of x-ray operator); Van Ingen
v. Jewish Hospital, 182 App. Div. 10, 169 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1918) (stranger
injured by ambulance driver). Contra: Bachman v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N. W. 751 (1923) and cases cited in
note 4 supra.
11 Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospital, 197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E.
672 (1929); Gable v. Salvation Army 186 Okla. 687, 100 P. (2d) 244 (1940).
Is 109 A. L. R. 1199, 1202. In the following cases recovery allowed:
Georgia Baptist Hospital v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101 (1927);
Old Folks' and Orphan Children's Home, Etc., v. Roberts, 91 Ind. App.
533, 171 N. E. 10 (1930); Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital,
104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922). In Southern Methodist Hospital &
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greater degree in that the burden of proof to establish due care in
the selection has been placed upon the charity itself.14
In other jurisdictions the harshness of the rule of non-liability has
been tempered by an interesting interpretation of the exemption. In
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 5 a paying patient sued for dam-
ages caused by a negligent injury and asserted that the trust fund
would not be depleted because of the existence, of an insurance policy.
The court admitted the rule of non-liability in that state but determined
that it extended no further than the protection of the trust property.
The decision continued:
"This, we think, is a recognition that a charitable institution
is liable for a tort of its agent and may be pursued to judg-
ment; but that the institution's trust property cannot be taken
to satisfy such judgment; and that where such institution has
liability insurance, such insurance is not trust property of
the institution and may be appropriated to the satisfaction
of such judgment."
After judgment, however, (which was limited to the policy) the
plaintiff discovered that the insurance was solely an indemnity con-
tract and he was unable to collect. He petitioned for a rehearing to
have the judgment extended to include the entire charity as such but
the court refused on the ground of protecting the trust property. A
similar rule was applied in the Morton case,' 6 where the court took
cognizance of the fact that a section was reserved exclusively for
paying patients, and that the greater portion of the patients was not
the recipient of charity. A judgment was entered to be satisfied exclu-
sively by the income from the non-charitable sources.' 7
Another method of holding eleemosynary institutions liable is to
distinguish between the type of torts committed. Thus even in Massa-
chusetts a tort committed in the procurement of funds will subject
the institution to damages. The court held that there was "a distinction
between activities primarily commercial in character," and "activities
carried on to accomplish directly the charitable purposes of the cor-
poration," and this was true even though the profit from the commer-
cial activities were used exclusively for charitable, purposes.' 8 In
Gamble v. Vanderbilt University,"9 a similar rule was applied since
the court felt that the activities resulting in the injury complained of
Sanatorium of Tucson v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P. (2d) 458 (1938) re-
covery was denied because of insufficient proof of negligence.
'Lewis et ux. v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n., 206 Cal. 115, 273
Pac. 580 (1928); contra: Waddell v., Young Women's Christian Ass'n.,
133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N. E. (2d) 140 (1938).
15 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938).
16 Morton v. Savannah, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918).
27 The case presents very clearly the distinction which the court draws
between the source of the funds. A petition which merely alleged injury
by a negligent servant, without alleging defendant's negligence in selec-
tion, was held not to be subject to demurrer as far as it affected funds
derived from non-charitable patients; but it was demurrable as far as it
attempted to subject the trust funds to the judgment.18McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op Industries & Stores, Inc., 272 Mass.
121, 172 N. E. 68 (1930); Cf. Reavey v. Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 300,
187 N. E. 557 (1933).
25138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510 (1918) (plaintiff was injured by a defec-
tive elevator in an office building owned by the defendant.)
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were too remote from the charitable purposes.
In some jurisdictions charitable corporations are held liable under
general statutory provisions. Thus in Howard v. Children's Hospital oJ
the Protestant Episcopal Church,20 the hospital was held liable for
wrongful possession of a corpse, although the defendant argued that
it should be exempt from the application of the statute imposing
liability. Likewise in Mclnerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n of Duluth,21
an employee was injured as a result of an unguarded mangle. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant was liable because of failing to
comply with the statutory requirement of a safety device for this
type of machine. The court sustained this interpretation refusing to
place charities above the law. Some jurisdictions, however, interpret
the statutes as not applicable to charitable institutions.
22
A growing minority of jurisdictions have completely repudiated
the doctrine of non-liability and apply the rule of respondeat superior
with equal vigor against charitable and business corporations.23 Recently
California has adopted this position after a series of cases tending
toward this liberal approach.2 4 New York has also adopted this view
but in this connection it is to be remembered that that jurisdiction does
not consider doctors, nurses, and others similarly situated, as servants
of the hospital, thus modifying to a great degree the effect of the
decision.2 5 The reasons advanced for destroying the immunity are
generally based upon considerations of public policy, the feeling that
it is unjust to inflict the whole burden of the negligence upon the
injured person or his family. 26 The fact that most charities, today, are
non-profit rather than charitable, 27 the belief that liability will improve
the degree of care exercised, and the illogic of the reasons for allowing
the immunity28 are other factors noted by the courts.
In Washington, the court has had several opportunities to pass
1037 Ohio App. 144, 174 N. E. 166 (1930).
21 122 Minn. 10, 141 N. W. 837 (1913).
11Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Ass'n., 230
Mass. 102, 119 N. E. 686 (1918).
" Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n. 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915);
Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931); Geiger
v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463
(1928); Mullinger v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota
Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of N. A., 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W.
699 (1920); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital (N. H.) 9 A. (2d) 761
(1939); Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P.
(2d) 996 (1938). See also Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital
Ass'n., 94 Utah 460, 78 P. (2d) 645 (1938); Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital,
12 R. I. 411, 43 Am. Rep. 675 (1879) committed Rhode Island to this
minority position. However, the legislature by express statute has now
again exempted charitable institutions from liability.
24 Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oakland, 14 Calif. (2d) 762, 97 P.
(2d) 798 (1939), and cases cited therein tracing the history of the exemp-
tion in California.
25 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163. 7
N. E. (2d) 28 (1937).
2OMulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota Dist.
of German Evangelical Synod of N. A.; Cohen v. General Hospital Soc.
of Conn., both supra note 23.
2" Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Calif. (2d) 762, 97 P. (2d) 798 (1939).
28Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota Dist.
of German Evangelical Synod of N. A., supra note 23; Sheehan v. North
Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28 (1937).
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upon the tort liability of charitable institutions. In the first case,
Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co.,29 our court apparently adopted
the majority rule as regards the rights of a beneficiary to sue. In that
case it was determined that a charitable corporation was not liable
for the negligence of its servants unless it was negligent in the selection
of its employees. In the Magnuson case,30 although our court discussed
the various theories for immunity, it did not adopt any of them. It,
however, did suggest that non-liability except for negligence in selection
was desirable since it would tend to encourage the establishment of
such charitable institutions-thus apparently using the broad general
policy as the reason for the decision. In subsequent cases our court
continued to reassert the doctrine83 of liability only for lack of due
care in the employment of servants.
An interesting situation was presented, however, in an action which
arose from the negligent injury to an unemployed worker whom the
Red Cross had hired at a small wage.32 The question involved was
the applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court found
that charities were not covered by the provisions thereof since the usual
profit from the employment was lacking, and the court again fell back
upon its usual approach to the problem of charitable exemption.
In addition there have been two recent cases which clearly presented
this question to our court. In Hickman v. Sisters of Charity,3 3 a visitor
at a nurses' graduation exercise was injured by a defect in the approach
to the hospital. The defendant contended that it was a charitable
institution and the plaintiff a recipient of its benefits. The court, how-
ever, rejected the argument, holding that the plaintiff, an invitee,
was entitled to recover, following the majority view in other juris-
dictions as to the right of a stranger to recover.
The rights of a paying patient were discussed in Miller v. Sisters of
St. Francis,34 in which our court adopted administrative, negligence
as a basis for liability. The case involved a nine-day-old baby whom
the nurse had left on an adult bed near a radiator while she left the
room. When she returned, the infant was found against the radiator
and seriously burned. The court instead of denying recovery upon the
theory of the negligence of the nurse in leaving the child unattended,
placed the decision upon the lack of sufficient cribs, and thus it held:
"A hospital, even though it be a charitable, institution such
as the one involved in this case, is liable for failure to furnish
proper equipment if damages result from that failure. This
is what is called administrative negligence, as distinct from
failure to exercise due care in the selection of proper
physicians and nurses."
6 Wash. 52, 32 Pac. 1012 (1893); 10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac. 95 (1895).
'o Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918).31 Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P. (2d) 807 (1939); Bise v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 181 Wash. 269, 43 P. (2d) 4 (1935); Tribble v. Missionary
Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 137 Wash. 326, 242 Pac. 372 (1926); Wharton
v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913). See-also Note (1926) 1 WASH.
L. REv. 282.32-Thurston County Chapter, American National Red Cross v. Dept. of
Labor & Industries, 166 Wash. 488, 7 P. (2d) 577 (1932).
S5 Wash. (2d) 699, 106 P. (2d) 593 (1940).
' 5 Wash. (2d) 204, 105 P. (2d) 32 (1940).
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The possibility of classifying numerous situations as administrative
negligence seems apparent and it is suggested that the case is itself
indicative of a more liberal attitude than prior cases. The concurring
opinion written by Justice Robinson favorably presents the arguments
for the complete abandonment of the tort liability exception.
It is suggested that from a logical as well as a humanitarian approach
the conclusion reached by the minority of jurisdictions is a more
satisfactory solution to the problem. The logical fallacies in all of the
rationales supporting the majority position have been pointed out in
a number of cases. 5 However, the very fact that most jurisdictions
recognize the propriety of strangers and servants recovering for a
tortious injury seems to impair the validity of all the suggested
rationales except the doctrine of implied waiver because the reasons
advanced would operate as effectively against such persons as against
the patients. The waiver theory also has been subjected to criticism
on the ground that the waiver is entirely fictitious, particularly in
the case of minors, insane persons, and patients who were unconscious
at the time of their admission to the hospital."0
In addition, there are other considerations which seem to support
the argument for liability: First, the widespread practice of such
charitable institutions to carry insurance to cover tort liability"'--
while it is true the mere fact of insurance protection is no reason for
enforcing liability,3s yet it does serve to protect the. trust fund from
depletion and thus destroys the reason for granting the immunity:
second, the business basis upon which most of these institutions are
operated freeing them from dependency upon bequests or trusts for
charitable purposes; 39 the economic development of these corporations
into enterprises well able to withstand a lawsuit without disaster;40 in
addition the ignorance of the general public of the existence of the
exemption and their belief that they will be entitled to recover for
improper care;41 and finally the injustice of forcing the individual to
11 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Mul-
liner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota Dist. of German
Evangelical Synod of N. A., supra note 23.
26 Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199
(1924), 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 402.
37 The following cases discussed the effect of the existence of an insur-
ance policy but recovery thereon was not allowed: Levy v. Superior
Court, 74 Cal. Ap. 225, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925); Enman v. Trustees of
Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930); Greatrex v. Evan-
gelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933); Herndon
v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. (2d) 914 (1940). In the following cases,
recovery was allowed because of the factor of insurance: O'Connor v.
Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n., 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d) 835 (1939);
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. Ap. 135, 127 S. W. (2d)
284 (1938). For a discussion of the effect of an insurance policy upon
liability see Note (1940) 20 B. U. L. REv. 330.
'" Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Ap. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925).
19 Modernly, there has been a tendency for the courts to examine into
the financial structure of the institution, noting particularly the profits
obtained by the operation of the hospital. Silva v. Providence Hospital of
Oakland, 14 Calif. (2d) 762, 97 P. (2d) 798 (1940); England v. Hospital of
Good Samaritan, 16 Calif. App. (2d) 640, 61 P. (2d) 48 (1936).
'0 Session v Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. (2d)
645 (1938).
"1England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, supra note 39; McLeod v.
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suffer the cost of the negligence of the corporation.42
The arguments against the destruction of this exception aside from
those of public policy generally are based on the assertion that any
other rule than immunity would subject such institutions to innumer-
able suits-many unfounded; that officials and servants would find
it necessary to devote a large portion of their time defending lawsuits
neglecting their ordinary duties; and finally that the funds would be
needlessly depleted. The validity of these objections is subject to
doubt. With the widespread use of insurance, the funds are adequately
protected; while the expense of litigation dnd the difficulties in estab-
lishing liability will serve as a deterrent to the dissatisfied patient.""
Thus in the light of all these factors it would seem that the. courts
would do well to keep in mind Prof. Scott's suggestion that such
institutions should be just before they are generous. 44
NONA B. FUmERTON.
St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (1936).
'
2 Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein of Minnesota Dist.
of German Evangelical Synod of N. A., supra note 23; for other reasons
supporting the minority position see Note (1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 1485.
'3 The question as to the liability of the institution to a charity patient
has apparently not been discussed directly by the case. On the basis of
logic and fairness, it would seem that such a person should be equally
entitled to recover. In this connection see Old Folk's & Orphan Children's
Home v. Roberts, 91 Ind. App. 533, 171 N. E. 10 (1930), where an orphan
was allowed to recover for the defendant's failure to employ competent
servants.
"3 ScoTT, TRuSTS (1939) § 402.
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